Important Considerations about ENIFLIX

This website describes the Italian oil giant's non-compliance to the "OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises", which were reported to the "National Contact Point for a Responsible Business Conduct in Brazil" (NCP Brazil), by Douglas Linares Flinto, a former executive of ENI's Brazilian subsidiary and founder & CEO of the Brazilian Business Ethics Institute. 

And this is the "essence" of this whistleblowing to NCP Brazil: 

An “unfair dismissal” in a proven “retaliation” imposed by the executives — including the members of the direction of Eni — which Douglas Flinto had denounced; the lack of “whistleblower protection” (in violation of the Code of Ethics), and the inclusion of his name on the “black list” of the Brazilian labor market, as well as Eni's corporate strategy to conduct this case that completed 21 long years: "systemic imposition of retaliations with attacks on his honor and reputation, and victimization instrumentally architected to exempt Eni from its own responsibilities", due to the "actions” and “omissions” by both Eni’s Brazilian subsidiary and Eni itself, which resulted in immeasurable “damage” and countless “losses” to the disadvantage of Douglas Flinto, all in accordance with the facts and supporting documents presented to NCP Brazil.

These attitudes of Eni, totally contrary to the principles and values of “Responsible Business Conduct” (RBC) - which is the heart of the "OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises"  and the foundation of the "OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Business Conduct" - destroyed my professional career forever and took my retirement away from my hands. As if that were not enough, when I was unfairly fired, Eni made me “miss the chance” of living a promising career at Petrobras alongside all my honest colleagues from Eni's Brazilian subsidiary, who have been working there from 2004 to this present day.

Finally, ENIFLIX is based on the orientation of the OECD Watch: "The submitters also feel free to publish your own Final Statement on the case proceedings and outcome submitted to a NCP".

Note: 
If you have any questions or suggestions, please contact Douglas Linares Flinto by e-mail: douglas@eticanosnegocios.org.br. 

Submissions by the Submitter to the NCP Brazil

At the beginning of the work of this Specific Instance, I presented some documents to NCP Brazil containing almost a hundred “web links” to access documents that made “full proof” of my allegations, as follows:

a) Initial Submission (Doc. 01): presented to NCP Brazil on July 16, 2020. Note that in this document has been attached the “Doc. 32” containing the “(expanded) chronology of the facts” (Doc. 02) with the purpose of “reconstructing the events” referring to the “actions” and “omissions” of Eni to my disfavor to prove the non-compliance with the OECD Guidelines;

b) Complementary Submission 01 (Doc. 03): Soon after the Initial Submission, NCP Brazil requested additional information;

c) Complementary Submission 02 (Doc. 04): As soon as Petrobras, the successor of the Brazilian assets of Eni since 2004, by determination of the Ministry of Transparency and General Controllership of the Union (CGU), due to the legal precepts of LAI (Law for Access to Information), gave me access (in November/2020) to several documents produced in 2001 and 2002, both by Eni's Brazilian subsidiary and by Eni itself, I sent to the NCP Brazil a new complementary submission on the said documents;

d) Reply to the Rapporteur (Doc. 05): After Eni's manifestation about my complaint to the NCP Brazil, the rapporteur of this Specific Instance made some questions that were answered within the established deadline.

Submissions by the Respondent to the NCP Brazil

a) Initial Manifestation (Doc. 01): Eni's first manifestation took place on March 9, 2021, in response to the allegations made in my initial submission. Note that NCP Brazil gave me access to this document only on August 3, 2021 (Doc. 02). However, at that moment, I didn't bother to “dispute” Eni's “narratives” because I was fully aware that the main objective of NCP Brazil, when conducting the work of a Specific Instance, is to offer the “Good Offices”;

b) Reply to the Rapporteur (Doc. 03): Then, on July 23, 2021, Eni's answered the additional questions of the rapporteur of this Specific Instance;

c) Acceptance of the Good Offices (Doc. 04): On September 03, 2021, NCP Brazil received a new document from Eni with the “acceptance” of the Good Offices;

d) Withdrawal of the Good Offices (Doc. 05): And, on April 15, 2022, Eni submitted a new document to the NCP Brazil with the “justifications” for the “withdrawal” of the Good Offices.

Translation of the Submitter's statements

According to an email from the Executive Secretariat of the NCP Brazil (Doc. 01), dated September 2, 2022, in response to my inquiries, it was informed that:

a) Eni received a translated version of the “initial submission” into English (Doc. 02);

b) Eni received, together with the English version, the original in Portuguese of the allegations (Initial Submission), with the information that all attached files were made available therein. Thus, it received the document 32 in the original (in Portuguese), as provided by the Submitter;

c) The additional information was used for the treatment of the Specific Instance by the NCP and was not made available to Eni.

Note that Eni did not receive from the NCP Brazil all of my manifestations in the English language, nor the "Doc. 32" — mentioned above — containing the “(expanded) chronology of the facts” (Doc. 03).

Also note that the non-receipt of all my manifestations reported to NCP Brazil cannot serve as a “justification” for Eni, since the company is fully aware of all the facts (and proofs) that are part of my allegations of their non-compliance with the OECD Guidelines. And that's because, over all these years, Eni was insistently contacted by me.

It is also important to emphasize that the “(synthetic) chronology of the facts” (Doc. 04), from now on called “chronology of facts”, for the “reconstruction of events” involving “actions” and “omissions” of Eni to my disadvantage, containing the "new documents" — which I received from Petrobras — were included in the "Proposal for Amicable Settlement" (Doc. 05).

This proposal was indisputably requested by Eni itself through the greatest Italian authority in Brazilian territory, the ambassador of Italy in Brazil, when I spoke with this diplomat at the end of November 2020.

“List of requirements” of Eni for participation in the Good Offices

It is essential to point out the “list of requirements” of Eni, presented to the NCP Brazil, when the company accepted to participate in the Good Offices (Doc. 01).

Note that, until Eni gave up the Good Offices, the NCP Brazil had informed me of only 2 (two) conditions of the company, which were immediately accepted and fulfilled by me.

The first requirement concerned the meetings with the mediators that should be held without the participation of the Parties, that is, they would be unilateral meetings. And the second condition was the “deleting” the “offenses” in disadvantage of Eni published on my personal social networks and also on the social networks “Eni’s Way”.

In fact, the overwhelming majority of these publications were just “negative publicity” replicated from the countless internet news stories about the “problems” in Eni’s management involving “disrespect for the environment” and “ethically questionable conduct”.

On this subject, it is essential to remember what the “Universal Declaration of Human Rights” itself guides on “freedom of opinion and expression”:

“Article 19: Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers”.

It is undeniable that the global corporate market is aware that there is an infinity of “negative publicity” about Eni and, for years, several institutions have promoted a “campaign” on the company's attitudes towards “ethics” and the “environment”, such as “Re:Common”, “Global Witness”, and “Greenpeace Italy”. The latter even called Eni a “climate killer” (Doc. 02) on May 10, 2022.

However, unlike the conduct adopted to my disadvantage, Eni did not prosecute any of these institutions for libel and defamation, much less the authors of the investigative book “Eni: The Parallel State” that published several “problems” in the management of the company in the period of 25 years (1990 to 2015).

Also note that the “requirements” of Eni are totally contrary to the “OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises” and the guidelines of the “OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Business Conduct”, as we will see later.

It is also necessary to emphasize that, during the entire process of this Specific Instance, including the attempt to jointly build the "ToR", through the sending to Eni by the NCP Brazil of my “Opening Speech” (Doc. 03), until the withdrawal of the mediation procedure by the Respondent, which took place on March 21, 2022, I had not had access to the document that contained the Respondent's “roll of requirements”.

Now, what are the real reasons for Eni “not authorizing” the NCP Brazil to give me access to this document?

Now, since Eni is a multinational and claims that it “accepts” and “follows” the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, does it not know that its requirements directly violate the guidelines of the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Business Conduct?

Now, was Eni not fully aware that the “list of requirements” would totally make my participation in the Good Offices unfeasible?

On the other hand, it is uncontroversial in this Specific Instance that, in all these years, I wait to speak with representatives of Eni. In addition to the presidency of AGIP Brazil (2001 - Doc. 04) and the Ethics Committee in Brazil (2002 - Doc. 05), I made contact with four different Boards of Directors and three different CEOs: Mr. Vittorio Mincato (2002 - Doc. 06), Mr. Paolo Scaroni (2009 - Doc. 07), and Mr. Claudio Descalzi (2014 - Doc. 08 and 2020 - Doc. 09). Despite being insistent, the Respondent never responded to my contacts!

In the same way, Mr. Mauro Meggiolaro, a journalist and critical shareholder of Eni, took my case to be discussed in four Shareholders' Meetings (AGM), in the years 2017, 2018, 2020, and 2021. Even during the AGM 2018, Mr. Meggiolaro, using the microphone, spoke about the “Flinto case” with all the members of the Board of Directors present at Eni's corporate auditorium in Rome. However, even after putting himself as our “mediator”, Eni never accepted to participate in a “mediation meeting” to try to put an end to our story. The words of this critical shareholder are immortalized in the minutes of the 2018 AGM (Doc. 10), available on the Eni's website.

Now, on June 3, 2020, when Eni's lawyers met with my lawyer, at the “Rome Mediation Agency” (Doc. 11), the company's participation was 'only' to fulfill a 'ordinance' of the magistrate of the Civil Court of Rome, imposed on Eni at the hearing on October 29, 2019 (Doc. 12). And that's because, if Eni had not participated in this mediation procedure, the company knew that the second lawsuit against me would be filed under the new Italian legislation, causing Eni to suffer a new defeat in the Italian Courts.

So, why would the Respondent have a different behavior in 2022 during the Good Offices offered by NCP Brazil?

Therefore, as demonstrated in the facts above, in these two decades, Eni was never willing to have a “friendly conversation” and, now in this Specific Instance, unlike what Eni claims, there is no “good faith”, nor “active participation”, much less “full cooperation” in the work developed by NCP Brazil. And that's because there is strong evidence that Eni is using a “premeditated strategy”, especially because the requirements of the Respondent demonstrates that it is “not willing” to discuss the constant guidance in the "OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Business Conduct” to verify if, in my case, Eni is (or is not) in compliance with the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.

And, because of that, it is extremely important that the NCP Brazil observe the following facts in relation to some of the “requirements” of Eni:

 

Eni's Requirement 01

“Participation in the procedure without any admission of liability on the part of ENI and with renewed affirmation of the correctness of ENI's actions in Mr. Flinto's case, including the responses in the shareholders' meeting made in 2017”.

Important Comments:

One of the most admired virtues in a human being is the courage to admit one's mistakes, to apologize, and to make amends to the person who was harmed by their actions or omissions. This quality is also observed in companies that share the premises, principles, and values of “Responsible Business Conduct” (RBC).

To insist on denying the responsibilities of AGIP Brazil and Eni itself to my disadvantage despite the facts being fully proven is something unworthy and dishonorable for any company.

Now, even with “best practices”, any company can cause or contribute to causing negative and harmful consequences that it did not foresee or was unable to avoid. And that is not a demerit for any company. Quite the opposite! It is cases like mine that make a company further improve corporate governance and the processes of “whistleblowing”, “protection of whistleblowers”, and “due diligence” (internal audit).

Note that the preface of the OECD Guide itself describes this type of situation: “OECD Guidelines recognize that business activities may result in adverse impacts related to corporate governance, workers, human rights, the environment, bribery, and consumers”.

A very important fact that needs to be noted by NCP Brazil in relation to the "3rd version" about my dismissal and, of course, will need to be included in the Final Statement of this Specific Instance.

There are only two possibilities for the content of Eni's presentation regarding the "3rd version" of my dismissal: either the version is "true” or the version is "false".

Therefore, by accepting this Specific Instance, the NCP Brazil would need to be “fully convinced” about the truth or falsity of this version about my dismissal. So, in my understanding, this context became the most important fact in this Specific Instance, and should be clarified and proven by the Parties.

Now, if this “3rd version” about my dismissal is the “true version”, then I was fired for participating in the millionaire scheme just like all the other employees of illicit behavior involved in the frauds and acts of corruption in the Brazilian subsidiary of the Respondent and, therefore, I am nothing more than an unscrupulous and opportunistic person because, for more than 21 years, I have been supporting an untrue story to take financial advantage of the Respondent.

On the other hand, if this “3rd version” about my dismissal is the “false version”, Eni will need to clarify to NCP Brazil the reasons for the company to conduct my case in the way it was stated (and proven) by me in this Specific Instance. 

Therefore, Eni will first need to thank me for my "ethical courage" in having followed the words and spirit of Eni's Code of Ethics and recognize that I was the “whistleblower” (as recognized by the Brazilian labor court), because, in fact, I was “unfairly” fired by executives, including members of the board of the Brazilian subsidiary of the Respondent in “retaliation”. 

Furthermore, Eni will then need to take the conduct expected by the OECD Guidelines and described in the OECD Guide: “apologize” to me and make a significant and proportionate "reparation" for the damages and losses I have suffered in all these more than 21 long years, because, in fact, my name was included in the “black list” of the Brazilian labor market, “destroying” my professional career forever and, as a consequence, I lost my “retirement”. As if it were not enough, when being unfairly fired, the Brazilian subsidiary of Eni made me “miss the chance” of having had a promising career at Petrobras alongside all my honest colleagues who have been there from 2004 until today.

So, Eni, in addition to not protecting the whistleblower, as determined by the principles enshrined in its own Code of Ethics, also attacked my honor and reputation with a “false version” of the real reasons for my dismissal, violating the OECD Guidelines, especially with regard to human rights.

Let us remember that, in 2010, when Eni brought the first lawsuit against me for libel and defamation, the company carried out the first attack on my honor and reputation when it presented the “2nd version” of my dismissal in the initial petition:

“To facilitate the comprehension of the Magistrate, I anticipate that, bearing in mind the communication of Douglas Flinto, while having not offered any documentary evidence that supports what was affirmed, he proposes a instrumental (functional) reconstruction of the causes that determined his termination from Agip Brazil in 2001, and used ENI's Code of Ethics with the only goal of openly and repeatedly defaming and discrediting the company.

We emphasize that, from the further developments conducted by ENI, nothing proves that any retaliation or violation of the law, nor of the consecrated principles in ENI's Code of Ethics, were practiced in prejudice to the employee from the former controlled Agip Brazil and, for bigger reason, from the former controlled ENI.

On the other hand, it is important to highlight that Douglas Flinto's termination had full justification in the reticent behavior and non-collaborative posture showed by the employee in the occasion of the company's undercover investigation that had as a goal to reveal potential prejudicial acts to the company itself, ceasing the trusting relationship with the company. His dismissal was unquestionably confirmed and recognized fully legitimate in the judicial instances in Brazil" (Doc. 01).

Despite my labor lawsuit against Eni's Brazilian subsidiary, which was filed in 2003 and finalized in 2009 — not for reasons of "merit", but for purely "procedural problems” (Doc. 02: Regional Labor Court Judgment and Doc. 03: Superior Labor Court Judgment) —, the judge of the 1st instance, due to total ignorance of what happens to whistleblowers in the global corporate world, could not see the moral damage I had suffered.

However, this judge recorded in the court decision (Doc. 04), dated March 29, 2004, that I, "fulfilling" the determinations of the Code of Ethics of Eni, provided "whistleblowing" of irregularities and illegalities that took place at AGIP Brazil. Therefore, the Brazilian Labor Court itself “recognized” that I was the “whistleblower”!

So, it is “uncontroversial” in this Specific Instance: I am the “whistleblower”, despite Eni never admitting this fact!

Now, if I am the whistleblower, the Respondent needs to “re-evaluate” our entire story based on this absolutely “uncontroversial” fact, and “manifest” itself to NCP Brazil.

Important Note: In 2015, these facts were presented to NCP Italy when I reported my allegations (“fully substantiated”) on Eni's non-compliance with the OECD Guidelines (Doc. 05), but NCP Italy decided not to proceed with this Specific Instance and filed this procedure without offering the Good Offices (Doc. 06).

It is also extremely pertinent to clarify to NCP Brazil that, when Mr. Mauro Meggiolaro, the Eni's critical shareholder, took my case for the first time to the Shareholders' Meeting (AGM) in 2017, he asked 10 (ten) questions — involving the "actions" and "omissions" of Eni’s Brazilian subsidiary and Eni itself (Doc. 07) — to be answered by the Board of Directors:

1) Are the employees, at any hierarchical level, encouraged by Eni to report to the company's internal channels - and / or the immediate superior - any fraud and corruption, misconduct of any other Eni employee, including the CEO, or even because of disagreements with the words and spirit of the company's Code of Ethics? Why is it important that its employees provide reports of irregularities and illegal activities? What are the measurable (and immeasurable) gains for the company?;

2) If an employee who reported something suffers any kind of retaliation, what actions should this employee take? Who, within the company's organizational chart, should the employee who’s suffered some type of reprisal look for? If the retaliation to an employee is confirmed, what are the attitudes that Eni will take?;

3) In 2001, after Mr. Flinto invoked Eni's "Ethics Commission" in Brazil, the CEO of the company's Brazilian operation stated (through an e-mail sent directly to Mr. Flinto) that his resignation was not a "retaliation", but rather an "administrative and organizational restructuring". Eni's headquarters in Italy says that it conducted an "internal investigation" in Brazil to investigate possible damage to the company itself and Mr. Flinto "did not cooperate" with the investigations and had a "reticent posture", resulting in a "breach of trust" and also in his "dismissal". Which of the "versions" presented by Eni about Mr. Flinto's dismissal is "true"?;

4) If there was an "internal investigation" in Brazil, why did Eni not present the results of this investigation as a "proof" in the lawsuit filed by Eni at the Court of Rome against Mr. Flinto?;

5) Eni states that the resignation of Mr. Flinto was "confirmed" by the competent courts of Brazil. Did Eni have access to the sentence of the Brazilian Justice? What was sentenced (“in full”) by the Brazilian Judge?;

6) If, in fact, Eni had access to the Brazilian court ruling, the company would know that the Judge stated in its sentence that "there was a Code of Ethics in Eni", that "there were irregularities and illegal activities in the Brazilian subsidiary of Eni" and that "Mr. Flinto provided a report to the company's internal channels" as it is imperative in the code itself. Now, if Mr. Flinto blew the whistle, if he sounded the alarm, providing a report about an alleged million-dollar scheme of fraud and corruption installed in the Brazilian subsidiary, then how come that Mr. Flinto "did not cooperate" and had a "reticent posture" in the time when the “internal investigations” were conducted, as it is stated by Eni?;

7) Why did Eni not respond to Mr. Flinto's correspondence sent to the company's "Board of Directors" under the management of Mr. Vittorio Mincato (2002), Mr. Paolo Scaroni (2009) and Mr. Claudio Descalzi (2014) reporting in full detail his retaliation case, after filing a complaint?;

8) Why, instead, did Eni choose to move a lawsuit against Mr. Flinto and the Brazilian Business Ethics Institute asking for a reparation of €15m?;

9) The ruling of the court of Rome says that the lawsuit brought by Eni against Mr. Flinto (and against the Brazilian Business Ethics Institute) is "groundless" and that the company hasn't specified any criteria for the assessment of alleged damages amounting at €15m. Why did the Board of Eni not ask the company's Internal Audit Department to conduct an "investigation" into Mr. Flinto's case?;

10) What does Eni intend to do in Mr. Flinto's case? What are the corrective actions against Mr. Flinto that can be put into practice by the company?.

However, instead of Eni answering each of these questions "individually", Eni "strategically" chose to produce a long text and coined the “corporate speech” to my detriment that had already been used by Eni on November 10, 2016, therefore, before the AGM 2017, to answer to the numerous “requests for clarification” made by Eni's Stakeholders —including the Italian government, the controlling shareholder — when I made contact to ask these Eni's Stakeholders for help.

Note that in the year 2016, I had made a complaint (Doc. 08) to the “Ethics Committee” of IIA Global, which is the largest representative institution for internal auditors worldwide. The accused were: a) Mr. Marco Petracchini (Internal Audit - Senior Executive Vice President) of Eni — who, at that time, was a member of the Board of the Italian branch office of this institution: AIIA Italy and, at the end of 2017, was the “co-author” of the second lawsuit that Eni move against me; b) Ms. Francesca Cottone, (Vice President Spot & Fraud Audit and Whistleblowing) of the Eni; and, c) Mr. Marcos Antonio Pinto (Internal Audit General Manager at Liquigás, a subsidiary of Petrobras) — who, until 2004, held a similar role in the Brazilian subsidiary of Eni.

In response to my complaint, the Respondent wrote to the CEO of AIIA Italy:

“The former employee of AGIP Brazil (former subsidiary of ENI, sold to third parties in 2004), after his departure in 2001, filed a lawsuit against AGIP Brazil for damages, not being successful in various degrees of judgment.

At the same time, on his own account and as a representative of the Brazilian Business Ethics Institute, Mr. Flinto began a personal battle against ENI. Since 2002, he has been sending a multitude of emails with defamatory content about the company.

In 2009, due to the repetition of these communications, ENI filed a civil lawsuit for defamation against Mr. Flinto. This process is currently in the appeal phase.

During 2014, the former employee also reinforced his communication initiatives with the creation, for alleged ethical purposes: of a website dedicated to ENI (www.enisway.com); a Blog and social media accounts of Eni's Way (Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, and Instagram). However, negative news about ENI is published and continuously implemented, retrieved from the network regardless of its validity, accompanied by derogatory comments and images. Even the communication received by IIA Global was published on websites and social networks.

In view of the most recent initiatives against ENI and its management and, in particular, against the entire structure directed by me and against myself, solely because of the position we hold, we are preparing the widest protection in criminal proceedings” (Doc. 09).

Also note that, in addition to Eni using the same “corporate speech” to answer its critical shareholder during the 2017 AGM, a paragraph of this long text caught my attention because Eni presented the "3rd version" about my dismissal:

“Contrary to what Mr. Flinto believes [...] The ex-employee was fired along with other actors of illicit behavior, for reticence, for having violated the obligation of confidentiality and for trying to instrumentally use the ENI Code of Ethics for personal advantage of the company" (Doc. 10).

In order to give “credibility” to this (untrue, defamatory, and slanderous) allegation made during the 2017 AGM, Eni stated — in this same document (Doc. 10) — that the result of this "investigation" had been published in the ENI Balance Sheet 2002 (Doc. 11). 

However, in the “354” pages of this “official document” by Eni (found only after an exhaustive internet search), there is not a single line about me... And there couldn't be!

Now, it's obvious! Eni “never” carried out an “in-depth investigation” into my case, as described by Eni in its “corporate policy” on the “Whistleblowing Process” (Doc. 12) - document attached to the Respondent's Code of Ethics.

Likewise, during the work of this Specific Instance, Eni “refused” to carry out a “due diligence” on my case in light of the “OECD Guidelines” and the guidelines contained in the “OECD Guide”.

It is indisputable that the content of the "3rd version" about my dismissal was an even more serious attack on my honor and reputation unfairly promoted by Eni.

It is also extremely important to note that, when Eni presented the “2nd version” about my dismissal in 2010, AGIP Brazil had not been a company controlled by Eni since 2004, much less in 2017, when the company presented the “3rd version” about my dismissal.

So, based on this reasoning, how did Eni stated in a “lawsuit” (2010) and in an “official document” from the company (AGM 2017) available on its corporate website the “circumstances” of my dismissal from the Brazilian subsidiary of Eni? Was Eni able to invent all this? Or did the company just “replicate and share” the information provided by AGIP Brazil about me before Eni's Brazilian assets were sold to Petrobras in 2004?

It is evident that I was always fully aware that my “unfair” dismissal from the Brazilian subsidiary of Eni had been a “retaliation”, and I also knew very well that the “internal audit” carried out at the Cuiabá Regional Sales Management (GRV- Cuiabá) had been a “fake” one because I was able to build a “DOSSIER” (Doc. 13) with more than 200 pages, proving the irregularities and illegalities in the GRV-Cuiabá despite not being an internal auditor. Therefore, how did the “experts” internal auditors of the Brazilian subsidiary of Eni not discover the conflicts of interest, internal fraud, and acts of corruption that I had denounced?

Now, if the "internal audit report" produced by AGIP Brazil had demonstrated everything I had denounced and proved by the documents contained in my "dossier", the company's first action would be the dismissal of the Regional Sales Manager of Cuiabá, his subordinates, and even his superiors, including the Commercial Director, located at the company's headquarters in Brazil.

However, the story narrated (and proven) in this Specific Instance confirms that things did not happen this way... The first to be fired was the one who should not have been, that is, the one who, complying with the determinations of Eni's Code of Ethics, had the “ethical courage” to report: the whistleblower!

So, making use of the legal precepts of the Law for Access to Information (LAI), I requested that the Ministry of Transparency and General Controllership of the Union (CGU) determine that Petrobras send me all the documents referring to the investigation process of my complaint, reported to the “Petrobras Whistleblowing Channel”, in 2017, and having as a “motivating fact” the “fraudulent internal audit” carried out by AGIP Brazil in 2001.

On June 24, 2019, the CGU issued its decision, in the following terms: 

“It is decided that the appeal should be granted, so that all documents relevant to their complaint reported to the PETROBRAS Whistleblower Channel in 2017 are forwarded to the citizen” (Doc. 14).

I confess that, not even in my best dreams, I could have imagined that one day the documents produced by AGIP Brazil and by Eni itself in 2001 and 2002 would be placed in my hands, and they would make even more proof of everything that I have repeatedly said during all these more than 21 long years: “my unfair dismissal from the Brazilian subsidiary of the Eni was a retaliation imposed by those I had denounced, including members of the direction”.

Note carefully the “content” of the documents I received from Petrobras, the successor to the Eni’s Brazilian assets:

Document 01:
Internal Audit Report (Doc. 15)

Prepared on July 26, 2001, the date after my complaint was made to the commercial direction and just six days before my dismissal from the Brazilian subsidiary of Eni.

The report, signed by the general manager of internal audit of AGIP Brazil at the time, pointed out only the "false invoices" issued against the company TELEMAT, proving what I had always said: the internal audit carried out at the Regional Sales Management of Cuiabá (GRV-Cuiabá) was a farce, as it did not point out all the conflicts of interest, internal fraud, and acts of corruption practiced by a group of employees, including the regional sales manager, in collusion with customers, to rob the coffers of Eni at about US$ 20 million a year. All these irregularities and illegalities had been indicated in my complaint and proved by my “dossier”.

Document 02:
Internal Audit Memorandum to the CEO of AGIP Brazil (Doc. 16)

A memorandum dated February 7, 2002, signed by the general manager of internal audit and sent to the CEO of Eni's Brazilian subsidiary, with a copy to the directors of the financial and commercial areas, just six days after I filed a new complaint — involving the operational area at GRV-Cuiabá — when I invoked the “Ethics Commission” in Brazil.

 The internal audit found that the former regional sales manager of GRV-Cuiabá did not appear in the "official documentation" of the two service stations owned by AGIP Brazil and operated by him, proving another point of my first complaint when I was an executive at Eni's Brazilian subsidiary: these service stations were in the hands of “front-men”.

Document 03:
Facsimile of the Respondent (Doc. 17)  

A fax sent by the headquarters of the Respondent (Italy) to the CEO of AGIP Brazil, on October 03, 2002, two months after my “complaint” was delivered to each of the members of the Board of Directors of Eni and to the main executives of the company, including the global CEO and the boss of the CEO of Eni's Brazilian subsidiary.

In this document, it is requested: “As agreed by telephone, I am sending you the documentation received from Douglas Linares Flinto. I request you to analyze and deepen the various points and send me your considerations as soon as possible”.

Document 04:
Memorandum from HR and Internal Audit to the CEO of AGIP Brazil (Doc. 18)

Just four days later, on October 7, 2002, a “memorandum” was signed by the director of Human Resources together with the general manager of Internal Audit of Eni’s Brazilian subsidiary.

This said document was sent to the CEO's AGIP Brazil with the “circumstances” of my dismissal, in response to the questions from Eni's headquarters (Italy).

Note that the content of this memorandum made me prove, with my own eyes, what I had always claimed: that members of the direction were involved in the irregularities and illegalities that took place in the bowels of the Brazilian subsidiary of Eni. And that's because the executives I denounced built a "new plot" to justify my dismissal, with the sole and Machiavellian purpose of disqualifying me, transforming me from a dedicated, committed, and excellent employee who fulfilled the determinations of Eni’s Code of Ethics, into an unbalanced, unscrupulous, unreliable, disloyal, and opportunistic professional. And what is even worse! The Brazilian subsidiary of Eni claimed between the lines that I was part of the “criminal organization” that operated in GRV-Cuiabá.

Check out the full text of what AGIP Brazil said about me:

In June 2001, the president of SindiPetróleo informed the headquarters of Agip Brazil that the Regional Cuiabá of Agip Distribuidora was billing fuel for customers classified as large consumers (lower price), but, in reality, they were delivering them at gas stations. As this operation could only be carried out with the knowledge of the Regional Commercial Manager who was on vacation, the Commercial Director and the Internal Audit Manager promptly went to the city of Cuiabá to talk to the Sales Coordinator, Mr. Douglas, privately.

In the visit and in the contacts with Mr. Douglas, these executives felt from Mr. Douglas a dubious, non-collaborative position, because if on one hand he reported that there were problems at GRV-Cuiabá, on the other hand, he didn't specify clearly and objectively. It was requested from Mr. Douglas an absolute confidentiality about this meeting that had even taken place outside the company.

It turns out that Regional Sales Manager, upon returning from his vacation, was immediately informed by Mr. Douglas that the Commercial Director and the General Manager of Internal Audit were in Cuiabá to inquire about problems in the management at GRV-Cuiabá, which naturally generated discomfort and embarrassment. This characterized a breach of trust by Mr. Douglas. When asked about this procedure, Mr. Douglas didn't know how to give a satisfactory explanation and began to blackmail by threatening that he would send denunciations to ENI, in Italy, to show that the management of Agip Brazil was not taking any steps to remedy irregularities. His unfounded accusation and unbalanced posture only confirmed the breach of trust, and there was, in fact, no reason for him to continue on the company's staff, which is why he was fired.

As the investigation of the facts by the Headquarters continued, the undue procedures reported by the president of SindiPetróleo were actually confirmed. Therefore, in August 2001, there was also the dismissal of the Regional Sales Manager and two Business Advisors from GRV-Cuiabá”.

There is not the slightest doubt that this “pseudo version” of my dismissal, presented by the executives I had denounced, including members of the direction of AGIP Brazil, had been sent to the headquarters of Eni (Italy) in that year of 2002.

However, AGIP Brazil's arguments about the “circumstances” of my dismissal were not enough to convince the Board of Directors of Eni. And that's because, if the directors of Eni had accepted and agreed with the “narrative” of the Brazilian subsidiary, the matter would have died and been buried forever. However, shortly after, Eni, taking advantage of my complaint, began the investigations and the necessary measures on the very serious facts that occurred at AGIP Brazil described by me to the Board of Directors and to the top executives of Eni.

This affirmation is so true that, just over thirty days after the Respondent received the memorandum from AGIP Brazil with the “circumstances” of my dismissal, a Eni’s “big boss” landed in Brazil on November 12, 2002, the CEO of AGIP Petroli (Italy), Mr. Angelo Mario Taraborelli, the immediate superior of the CEO of the Eni's Brazilian subsidiary.

This illustrious visit was reported by the magazine “Agip in Action” (Doc. 19), a publication sent to all AGIP service stations installed in Brazil.

A few weeks later, in December 2002, an avalanche of layoffs began at AGIP Brazil of all those involved in the fraud I had reported to Eni, including middle and top management executives and even the director of the commercial area, who was fired in June 2003, before Eni's Brazilian assets were sold to Petrobras.

It is irrefutable in this Specific Instance the fact that, the "untrue, defamatory, and libelous content" of this memorandum with the "circumstances" of my dismissal — contrary to the facts (and proofs) presented in this Specific Instance and, repeatedly to Eni throughout these two decades — was “replicated” and “shared” by Eni when the company presented the “2nd version” (2010) and the “3rd version” (AGM 2017) about my dismissal.

I also need to underline something very important. These new documents were the last four pieces that were missing to completely assemble the puzzle of my story with Eni. And so, all the reprehensible and unjustifiable acts of AGIP Brazil could be visualized, as well as the questionable attitudes, misconceptions, and errors of Eni to my disfavor and contrary, not only to the corporate commitments assumed by Eni — including in its Code of Ethics, which states that the company will “protect whistleblowers” — but especially to the international commitments “accepted” and “followed” by Eni, such as the OECD Guidelines and UNGP 31.

And it was this complete puzzle that motivated me to write to the NCP Brazil again, in July 2020, and the most relevant point of this “new complaint” was exactly the “new attack” on my honor and reputation promoted by Eni during the AGM 2017, as well as the “new documents” I had received from the successor to Eni’s Brazilian assets, that were sufficiently capable of further proving my allegations against Eni.

Note that, since it was indisputably proved in this Specific Instance, I was the victim of my own whistleblowing because both Eni’s Brazilian subsidiary and Eni itself took all the “bonuses” of my complaints, and, throughout all these for years, I have been bearing all the "burdens" for having had the "ethical courage" to comply with the words and the spirit of Eni's "Code of Ethics", resulting, evidently, in countless damages and immeasurable losses to my disadvantage.

However, I am fully aware that the certainty of having done what is right does not guarantee any reward, but it does guarantee peace. And there is no greater reward than the peace of having done what is right, despite the fact that during these two decades I have been trying tirelessly and unceasingly, and with every legal instrument at my disposal, to rescue and restore my name, my honor, and my reputation that have been unjustly denigrated by Eni.

Furthermore, only the truth can be proven because it's not possible to prove lies! And this is the reason for Eni, during all the works of this Specific Instance, to be distorting and manipulating the truth of the facts without presenting proofs of its narratives instrumentally conceived in my disfavor. And, what is even more serious, Eni is disregarding the guidelines contained in the OECD Guide by refusing to carry out a “due diligence” on my case in the light of the “chronology of the facts” (Doc. 20), which was sufficiently capable of “reconstructing the events” about the “actions” and “omissions” of Eni’s Brazilian subsidiary and of Eni itself to my disadvantage.

Eni's requirement 02

“Participation in the procedure for mutual clarification without any payment of compensation for damages, nor labour reinstatement, given the absence of any title of liability on the part of ENI”.

Important Comments: 

This requirement is genuinely legitimate, provided that Eni does everything in accordance with what the OECD Guide directs multinational companies to do, as will be described in this website.

Note that, in the global corporate world, it is indisputable that every multinational company, especially those that benefit from reputational gains, by propagating to their Stakeholders that they “accept” and “follow” the OECD Guidelines, as is the case with Eni, has full knowledge that when a multinational company causes any kind of damage, there must be a “reparation” proportionate to the damage caused.

Now, this relationship between “cause” and “effect”, that is, “damage” and “reparation”, is described in the commitments assumed by Eni — whether corporate commitments, such as the “Eni's Statement on respect for human rights” (Doc. 01), whether the international commitments “accepted” and “followed” by Eni —, which state that "reparation" is due, if the company harms or contributes to harm someone.

Therefore, it is not enough for Eni to make this type of demand and machiavelly state to the NCP Brazil that my objective was never to rescue my name, my honor, and my reputation, but rather to obtain an "indemnity", and Eni forgets that “reparation” is due when a multinational corporation cause (or contributes to causing) harm to someone. Instead, the Eni should accept the contributions of NCP Brazil in this Specific Instance, as directed by the OECD itself, in order to verify if, in fact, the company caused (or did not cause) harm to me.

However, in order for this verification to be achieved, Eni will need to have attitudes guided by the OECD Guide and not just stating to the NCP Brazil that it has no responsibility in relation to my case and giving up the Good Offices, justifying that my “opening speech” (Doc. 02), made available by NCP Brazil to Eni (in February 2022), was not “in line” with its “requirements”.

Now, this is not the attitude of a company that claims to be committed to the premises, principles, and values of “Responsible Business Conduct”, which is the “ethical foundation” of the OECD Guidelines.

Eni's requirements 03 and 04

“Involvement of the Italian National Contact Point in the Good offices procedure”;

“Exposure of ENI's position, as well as the advice of the Italian NCP in this procedure, in the final decision even in the event of early closure of the procedure".

Important Comments:

The demands made by Eni in relation to the NCP Italy are unnecessary, since, the OECD Procedural Guidance already contemplate the “support” of the NCP of the country in which the company was incorporated to “the host NCP”, as is the NCP Brazil in this Specific Instance.

Therefore, according to these OECD guidelines, it will be up to the NCP Italy to make every effort to help the parties resolve the issues “by providing adequate and timely assistance”.

Note that for all these years, Eni has refused to carry out a “due diligence” on my case. And this corporate conduct continues to be practiced in this Specific Instance, directly violating the guidelines of the OECD Guide.

Furthermore, the “attacks” (that I fully substantiated) against my honor and reputation violate “Article 12” of the “Universal Declaration of Human Rights”. 

So, Eni is also violating the guidelines contained in UNGP 31 (Doc. 01), including with regard to Principle 04 that establishes the nexus between the State and companies:

Principle 4: 

“States should take additional steps to protect against human rights abuses by business enterprises that are owned or controlled by the State, or that receive substantial support and services from State agencies such as export credit agencies and official investment insurance or guarantee agencies, including, where appropriate, by requiring human rights due diligence”.

Commentary: 

“States individually are the primary duty-bearers under international human rights law, and collectively they are the trustees of the international human rights regime.

Where a business enterprise is controlled by the State or where its acts can be attributed otherwise to the State, an abuse of human rights by the business enterprise may entail a violation of the State’s own international law obligations. Moreover, the closer a business enterprise is to the State, or the more it relies on statutory authority or taxpayer support, the stronger the State’s policy rationale becomes for ensuring that the enterprise respects human rights.

Where States own or control business enterprises, they have greatest means within their powers to ensure that relevant policies, legislation and regulations regarding respect for human rights are implemented. Senior management typically reports to State agencies, and associated government departments have greater scope for scrutiny and oversight, including ensuring that effective human rights due diligence is implemented. (These enterprises are also subject to the corporate responsibility to respect human rights).

A range of agencies linked formally or informally to the State may provide support and services to business activities. These include export credit agencies, official investment insurance or guarantee agencies, development agencies and development finance institutions. Where these agencies do not explicitly consider the actual and potential adverse impacts on human rights of beneficiary enterprises, they put themselves at risk – in reputational, financial, political and potentially legal terms – for supporting any such harm, and they may add to the human rights challenges faced by the recipient State (In this case, the institutions officially linked to the Italian State are the largest shareholders of the Respondent: the Ministry of Economy and Finance, and CDP SpA).

Given these risks, States should encourage and, where appropriate, require human rights due diligence by the agencies themselves and by those business enterprises or projects receiving their support” 

In this sense, it would be pertinent and appropriate for the NCP Italy to provide assistance in this Specific Instance if, perhaps, the NCP Brazil, through my manifestation, is not able to raise awareness and sensitize, convince, and motivate the Respondent to carry out a "due diligence".

Note that NCP Italy, is part of the Italian government, the “controlling shareholder” of Eni. Therefore, the NCP Italy will be able to contact the “government structure” of Italy so that of the Board of Directors of Eni is “required” to carry out a “due diligence” on my case.

Also note that, according to the new chapter on human rights, introduced in the OECD Guidelines, from 2011 onwards, it is agreed that the principle of a company's liability is determined by its adverse impacts, in line with UNGP 31.

Manifestation after Eni's withdrawal of the Good Offices

Upon becoming aware of the content of these three documents, it was very easy to see that the “arguments” of Eni to my disadvantage were not substantiated by “proofs” and, consequently, these arguments are only “narratives” instrumentally conceived with the objective of exempting Eni of its own responsibilities. Furthermore, these allegations had one thing in common: Eni continued to attack my honor and reputation unfairly.

Due to this situation, I requested a “deadline” so that the NCP Brazil could receive my “manifestation” about the Respondent's narratives.

On May 6, 2022, NCP Brazil sent me an email (Doc. 01), in the following terms:

“3. Additional manifestation by the Submitter

[...] Considering the late access to company manifestations due to the recent receipt of public versions, it was decided to exceptionally allow the submission of such manifestation. Given that the Final Statement is already being concluded, we ask that the document be sent preferably with an English version that can be shared with the Respondent”.

Even though the procedures — for conducting the work of a Specific Instance — are described in the “NCP Brazil Manual”, the “adversarial and full defense principles” cannot be forgotten, ignored, or belittled.

So, I prepared a manifestation (Doc. 02) – to dispute, contest, refute, deny, and question the narratives presented by the Respondent in these 3 (three) public documents — divided into the following topics:

● Preliminary considerations (Doc. 02-A); 

● The nexus between the subsidiary AGIP Brazil and the parent company ENI (Doc. 02-B);

● The judicial process in Brazil (Doc. 02-C); 

● The first lawsuit in Italy (Doc. 02-D); 

● The second lawsuit in Italy (Doc. 02-E);

● Specific Instances: NCP Brazil and NCP Italy (Doc. 02-F);

● The reconstruction of events (Doc. 02-G); 

● ENI and NCP Brazil (Doc. 02-H); 

- ENI's list of requirements
- Opening Speech

● Proposals of Amicable Settlement (Doc. 02-I);

● Reparation (Doc. 02-J); 

- Code of Ethics
- Whistleblowing Process
- ENI’s Statement on Respect for Human Rights
- United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights
- OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Business Conduct
- Global Reporting Initiative

● Objective criteria for the reparation (Doc. 02-L);

- The length of the story
- Black List
- Dilapidation of the asset
- Retirement loss
- A missed chance
- Petrobras
- ENI Executive & Executive fired from ENI
- Lawsuit in the USA
- ENI is convicted in Italy 

● Reparation in the “Flinto case” (Doc. 02-M); 

● Conclusion (Doc. 02-N);

● Final considerations (Doc. 02-O)

- Confidentiality
- Final Statement
- Law for Access to Information

And since the NCP Brazil requested that this manifestation of mine be written in the English language so that it could be “shared” with Eni, I imagined that the draft of the Final Statement would only be completed after company's “reaction”, not just about the facts (and proofs) presented but, especially because the guidelines of the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Business Conduct, with direct relation to my case and that are being neglected by the Eni, were listed in my manifestation.

Note that, although my manifestation was received by NCP Brazil on May 30, 2022, eighty-two days later, on August 22, 2022, I received that draft. And, according to information from NCP Brazil itself, my manifestation was sent to Eni later just for their knowledge(!?).

In my understanding, the “priority” of the NCP Brazil should have been to know the arguments of Eni about what was presented in my manifestation and not the conclusion of the elaboration of the draft of the Final Statement and the approval of its terms by the Interministerial Working Group of the NCP Brazil (IWG-NCP).

Important Note: This “manifestation” of mine was also sent to Eni's Stakeholders in the hope that they could raise awareness and sensitize, convince, and motivate the Eni's Board of Directors to carry out a “due diligence” on my case. Get to know some of these “standard emails” sent to the same Stakeholders of Eni who had received my “memorial”: Transparency International (Doc. 03); Mood's (Doc. 04); Prime Minister of Italy (Doc. 05); President of Italy (Doc. 06); WBCSD Italy (Doc. 07); UN Human Rights (Doc. 08); OECD Watch (Doc. 09); and OECD (Doc. 10).

Attitudes after the withdrawal of the Good Offices

After Eni gave up on the Good Offices, on March 21, 2022, without having concluded (and signed) the Terms of Reference (ToR), let alone having held the first mediation meeting, I took 4 (four) attitudes:

MEMORIAL TO ENI'S STAKEHOLDERS 

I prepared a new “memorial” (Doc. 01), describing in detail the events that took place from 2001 to March 2022, providing full proof of everything that was stated. In this material, sent to Eni's Stakeholders and to the Italian government, the company's controlling shareholder, at the beginning of April 2022, my "expectations" were described in relation to Eni itself. 

And, at the end of the “standard email” it was requested that: “After the relevant analyzes and reviews, I would like your organization to be able to take the necessary steps regarding ENI, and for me be informed about these actions”.

Important Note: Know the “standard email” sent to some of the Respondent's Stakeholders: CDP SpA (Doc. 02); Confindustria (Doc. 03); EcoVadis (Doc. 04); IIA Global (Doc. 05); GRI (Doc. 06); and OECD (Doc. 07). Both the NCP Brazil and the NCP Italy, as they are Stakeholders of the Respondent, also received this standard email.

COMPLAINT AT THE UN - HUMAN RIGHTS

On April 6, 2022, I formalized a complaint (Doc. 08) on the website “United Nation Human Rights”, reporting the attacks on my honor and reputation promoted by Eni when the “2nd version” and “3rd version” were presented about my dismissal.

Now, the “attacks” of Eni against my honor and reputation were “fully proven” in this Specific Instance. This unfair corporate conduct is protected by the Constitution of Brazil (1988) and reproved in the “Universal Declaration of Human Rights” (UN - 1948):

“Article 12: No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honor and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks”.

In addition, the 2011 update of the OECD Guidelines included a “new chapter” on human rights, consistent with the “UNGP 31”.

EXTRAJUDICIAL NOTICE FOR ENI

My lawyer prepared an “extrajudicial notification” (Doc. 09) that was sent to Eni on April 7, 2022, with a copy to the company's outsourced lawyer with two purposes. The first was in relation to the “Proposal for Amicable Settlement”, requested by Eni itself on November 2020 and which, as of the date of this notification, had not been responded to. And the second and main purpose was to increase my limitations period in relation to any legal action against Eni in order to request in the Italian court a “reparation” for all the damages that I have been suffering.

LAW FOR ACCESS TO INFORMATION 

Because the NCP Brazil is part of the “governmental structure” of Brazil, that is, it is part of the “Direct Public Administration” and, therefore, it is achieved by the legal precepts of the Law for Access to Information (LAI), I made a request to the Ministry of Transparency and General Controllership of the Union (CGU) so that I could have access to “the entire process” of this Specific Instance, especially since all of Eni's manifestations concerned — only and solely — my own person.

Note that the access of the litigants to the documents of the respective Specific Instance is provided for, even in the NCP Brazil Manual (paragraph 10.8).

On April 11, 2022, CGU sent me the response from NCP Brazil about my request: 

“In consideration of your request, we inform you that the document(s) requested in your request constitute preparatory documents included in the scope of Process nº 19971.100637/2020-06, which is under analysis by the Coordination of the Point of National Contact - NCP Brazil. It should be clarified that art. 20, of Decree nº 7.724/2012, which regulates the Law for Access to Information (Law nº 12.527/2012), establishes that 'access to a preparatory document or information contained therein, used as a basis for decision-making or administrative act, will be ensured from the publication of the act or decision'.

In this sense, we inform you that it is necessary to wait for the publication of the decision-making act related to the aforementioned process (Final Statement), so that the required documents can be made available, since their availability may cause damage to the preparation and publication of the Final Statement" (Doc. 10).

Even with this position made at the CGU, after two weeks, on April 29, 2022, NCP Brazil gave me access to the other 3 (three) documents of Eni that I had not yet been aware of.

It is extremely important for NCP Brazil to note that these documents, in addition to “public versions”, deal solely and exclusively with me and, therefore, can never be recognized as “confidential documents”, even more so because there is no sensitive information much less any mention of third parties, all in accordance with the legal precepts of LAI (Law for Access to Information) that end up “validating” and “endorsing” these statements.

Requests of the Submitter to NCP Brazil

1) That the Final Statement of this Specific Instance is only published after the NCP Brazil take the necessary measures in relation to my requests here listed. These requests were also motivated by the guidance of the NCP Brazil Manual itself: “7.6: After hearing the parties, the NCP Brazil may initiate or resume the mediation process at any time during the preparation of the Final Declaration of a Specific Instance”;

2) That the NCP Brazil grant a “term” of 15 (fifteen days) for Eni to “manifest” itself on the “content” of this “new manifestation” (Doc. 01) of mine (dated October 03, 2022);

3) That the NCP Brazil can clarify to Eni about the need to carry out a “due diligence” on my case in the light of the guidelines of the "OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Business Conduct", to analyze the allegations and supporting documents presented in this Specific Instance, including the “chronology of the facts” (Doc. 02), so that it can be verified whether Eni caused (or did not cause), contributed (or did not contribute) to adverse impacts to my disadvantage;

4) If Eni does not accept the suggestion of the NCP Brazil, mentioned in item “c”, that the NCP Brazil can count on the “engagement” of the Italian NCP in order to inform the government of Italy — in the capacity of “controlling shareholder” of Eni — the need to “require” that the Board of Directors carry out a “due diligence” on my case, in accordance with the guidelines contained in the international commitment that Italy is an “adhering nation”: the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (Principle 4);

5) In the event that Eni continues to insist on not performing the necessary “due diligence”, that the Final Statement may contain the following “determinations”:

● Eni's denials in relation to the requests mentioned in item “c” and “d” described above;

● That, regarding my case, Eni is not in compliance with the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, including the guidance of the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Business Conduct.

6) That NCP Brazil call for this Specific Instance an “expert” in “corporate investigations” so that a “due diligence” can be carried out in the “chronology of the facts” to “reconstruct the events” presented by me in this Specific Instance, including in the Final Statement this procedure adopted by the NCP Brazil and the "summary" of the result of this "technical opinion";

7) That this Final Statement may also contain “recommendations” for Eni regarding the “whistleblowing process”, especially on issues related to “protection of whistleblowers” and “due diligence” (internal audit);

8) That the NCP Brazil can carry out the necessary follow-up of the recommendations mentioned in item “g” during the period of 6 (six) and 12 (twelve) months after the publication of this Final Statement, preparing new statements on the corporate progress of Eni;

9) That the Final Statement is a “mirror” of everything that has been presented by the Parties in this Specific Instance, and that the content of this document is written in an organized and easy-to-understand manner;

10) And finally, that NCP Brazil may write this Final Statement according to the “model” (the “standard” of Final Statement) used in Specific Instance nº 02/2020, referring to the Brazilian multinational Vale S/A, published on October 28, 2021 (Doc. 03).

 These "requests" to NCP Brazil were "based" in everything described on this website as well as in the OECD Report (2020) called "Providing access to remedy 20 years and the road ahead”; in the suggestions of OECD Watch; in the OECD Procedural Guidelines and in several points listed in the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Business Conduct, as we will see below:

Recommendations from NCP Brazil to Eni

Note that in the "draft" of the Final Statement, there is no recommendation from the NCP Brazil to Eni. The justification is that: "considering that the Specific Instance deals with acts relating to a specific case involving litigation between the Parties [...] this Specific Instance is concluded without recommendations for the Parties".

However, Eni's conduct is not an isolated case. Quite the opposite! The facts below — which are very similar to my case presented in this Specific Instance — demonstrate that Eni has "numerous" and "serious" problems involving the "Whistleblowing Process":

a) YEAR 2013:

In 2013, a “blog” maintained by a university professor and environmental activist, Mr. Maria Rita D'Orsogna, hosted in an Italian newspaper, told the story of Mr. Gianni Franzoni, an oil tanker captain for the company SAIPEM, a company controlled by Eni.

The report, entitled “In the open sea, the eyes do not see and the heart does not hurt” (Doc. 01), says that, in 2007, Mr. Franzoni became aware of numerous technical and certification irregularities. Their findings indicated that “SAIPEM was carrying out naval operations, oil drilling, and industrial work in deep waters without adequate personnel, in violation of issued certifications or even without the necessary certificates as required by Italian law and international regulations. All this, so as not to have to restructure and update its infrastructure, putting workers and the environment at risk”.

The blogger also says that: “Instead of the company thanking the captain for his work, for his ethical courage, and for his love of the sea, he was the first to be fired, in 2012. Mr. Franzoni did everything he had to do. First, he presented his complaint within SAIPEM, in accordance with the Code of Ethics. Then he wrote to the 'Ethics Commission' — those who should verify the allegations through a 'due diligence' (internal audit). And, after being fired, the commander wrote an 'open letter' to the CEO of the Respondent (Mr. Paolo Scaroni), in 2013 (Doc. 02). As the Respondent did nothing, he filed a 'criminal complaint' to the Italian Public Ministry (Doc. 03)”.

In 2014, Mr. Franzoni made contact with me. But what could I do to help him, other than publish his story with the Respondent on my social media?

b) YEAR 2016:

An Italian journalist, when breaking the news of the dismissal of this other employee of Eni, was quite blunt in naming his article, in 2016: “Eni, games and porn movies in the control room. Dismissed for having denounced the truth” (Doc. 04).

c) ANO 2017:

Contrary to what Eni informed the NCP Brazil, the “audit” carried out by RINA Services in 2017 had nothing to do with my specific case.

The truth is that, in 2017, as CEO of the Brazilian Business Ethics Institute, I received two “anonymous whistleblowing” involving fraud and acts of corruption in the Americas (Brazil, Venezuela, Mexico, and the United States) carried out by managers and executives of the Respondent and with the involvement of top people, located at the Respondent's headquarters in Rome.

The aforementioned anonymous whistleblowing reached my hands at the same time. But one of them was posted in the US Post Office (Doc. 05) and the other one in the Italian Post Office (Doc. 06).

Now, what are the reasons for Eni's Stakeholders to send “complaints” to me? Why were these complaints not sent to the “Whistleblowing Channel” of Eni itself? Why were these serious complaints involving executives from Eni's top management not sent directly to the “Board of Directors”?

Could the answer be related to the suspicion of Eni's Stakeholders in the "whistleblowing process" that does not have sufficient credibility and is not a credible procedure? Or would the answer lie in the fact that Eni’s employees are being fired after filing a complaint?

As soon as I received these anonymous reports, I forwarded them both to Eni's internal channels and to RINA Services, a multinational company that certifies ISO standards, with 160 years of experience in a wide range of sectors, operating in 70 countries, with 200 offices and more than 4,000 professionals, but headquartered in Italy (!?).

In 2022, due to documents attached to the second lawsuit filed by Eni against me, I learned that, in May and June 2017, RINA Services carried out a “complex audit” of Eni (is that right?) about the “anti-bribery management system” of the ISO 37001 standard. After the work, an “internal audit report” was prepared (Doc. 07).

Note that a “statement” (Doc. 08) was prepared by RINA Services - four years after such internal audit - on June 04, 2021 (at which time, coincidentally, Eni was already participating in this Specific Instance), being stated that: 

“[...] It requested detailed information regarding the management of the aforementioned situations and planned an additional audit to assess the correct management of the report according to the requirements, the reference standards and in order to be able to give a correct answer to the complainant, Mr. Douglas Linares Flinto”.

However, I never received any kind of response, neither from Respondent nor RINA Services. Why not?

Considerations on the "draft" of the Final Statement

In the month of September 2022, NCP Brazil sent me the "draft" of the Final Declaration of this Specific Instance.

I should make suggestions for "changes" to the content of this draft with the respective "justifications".

In my understanding, the rapporteur of a Specific Instance is the main observer of everything that has been alleged (and proven) by the Parties and, therefore, must prepare the Final Statement honestly, being careful to reinforce the separation between opinion and facts, and giving strict attention to the truth to bring credibility to their work and present a well-written text, as this will be essential for the receiver to make their own reflections.

Likewise, the Final Statement should describe the facts as they are and as objectively and impartially as possible. And that's because the main purpose of the Final Statement is to express the exact reflection of reality, rejecting any narrative component that is not the complete description of the facts. Therefore, any change could distort the reality of how the facts happened.

Furthermore, as we saw earlier, a Specific Instance is a “non-judicial process” and, for this reason, there is no “condemnatory sentence”, as there is in the labor, civil, or criminal spheres.

However, by way of elucidation and analogy with the Final Statement, we will need to observe the “legal standard” of a judgment in the judicial sphere:

Report: It will contain the names of the Parties, the identification of the case, with the totality of the request and the contestations, and the record of the main occurrences that occurred in the course of the process;

Substantiation: It concerns the questions of fact and of law that were analyzed by the Judge when explaining the reasons why he formed his conviction about how the facts occurred (based on the allegations and proofs) and what legal consequences are applicable. This is the most extensive chapter of the sentence, since it is here that all the elements that must be taken into account (onus, proofs, presumptions, allegations of the Parties, legal provisions, etc.) are concentrated. It is here that the questions (controversial points) of fact and law must be resolved, exposing the reasons that guide the correlated solution. There is a real argumentative burden on the judge, who cannot fail to examine all the elements that are presented to him, which will establish parameters that should guide the task of presenting the sentence;

Device: It is the chapter of the sentence in which the result of the judgment is established: deciding or not the merits.

Therefore, the NCP Brazil, when completing the preparation of the Final Statement of this Specific Instance, should pay particular attention to the part that concerns the "report" and the "substantiation" so that this document is a mirror of this case and can reflect completely, everything that was manifested (and proved) by the Parties.

Although the NCP Brazil does not make a “judgment” on the conduct of companies in relation to the OECD Guidelines (as provided in “item 7.5.1”, of the NCP Brazil Manual), OECD Watch “encourages” NCPs to “include” in its Final Statement “a determination as to whether or not the company has met the expectations of the OECD Guidelines”.

1) STRUCTURE: 

With all due respect, it is essential to make a constructive criticism of the “structure” of the draft of the Final Statement of this Specific Instance.

Note that the document has “130” paragraphs, with 57 paragraphs (almost 50%) intended for the bureaucratic procedures of NCP Brazil.

On the other hand, the Final Statement reporting the non-compliance with the OECD Guidelines of the Brazilian multinational "Vale S/A" (Specific Instance nº 02/2020 - Doc. 01) had a very different structure that included the Parties' allegations, the additional procedures made by the NCP Brazil, the counter-allegations, and even the new manifestations of the Submitter and the Respondent, all of which were described in an organized and easy-to-understand manner.

2) DECONTEXTUALIZATION 

In the case of this Specific Instance, the result of the current structure and the way in which the draft of the Final Statement was written ended up decontextualizing the “chronology of the facts” presented by me in this Specific Instance through abundant, rich, and robust "supporting documentation" that , undeniably, were sufficiently capable of “reconstructing the events”, involving the “actions” and “omissions” of Eni’s Brazilian subsidiary and of Eni itself due to my “unfair” dismissal, which indisputably was in “retaliation”; and the lack of "whistleblower protection" (as determined by Eni’s Code of Ethics) as well as Eni's strategy to conduct the "Flinto case", which was also unquestionably used in this Specific Instance: "systemic imposition of retaliation with attacks on my honor and reputation, and instrumentally engineered victimization”.

Through the affirmation in the previous paragraph, Eni needs to present to the NCP Brazil a justification for the following question: "If the facts and the dozens of supporting documents presented by me were not sufficiently capable of "reconstructing the events", what then would be the reasons for two renowned Italian journalists to publish my story with the Respondent in an 'investigative book' (Eni: The Parallel State) which, in a few months, became a bestseller in Italy, and another journalist, a 'critical shareholder' of the Respondent, to take my case to be discussed in the course of four different shareholders' meetings?”.

Therefore, with the chronological presentation of facts that are fully proven and that are indisputably capable of convincing anyone, Eni needs to answer to the NCP Brazil a very pertinent question: "What would be the result of a "due diligence" conducted by the Internal Audit Department of the Respondent, if an ‘in-depth investigation’ was carried out on everything that was presented (and proven) in this Specific Instance?”.

And, unlike what Eni claims to NCP Brazil, I reiterate that the company is not acting in good faith, nor is it having an active participation, much less full collaboration in the work carried out by NCP Brazil, as it is unquestionable that Eni entered this Specific Instance with the predisposition not to carry out a “due diligence”, much less to carry out a “remediation”, as this conduct of Eni was absolutely clear when we observed its “list of requirements” totally contrary to the guidelines from the OECD Guide.

As a result, despite Eni's adverse impacts to my detriment have been fully proven, Eni may say goodbye to this Specific Instance — after the publication of the Final Statement — in non-compliance with the OECD Guidelines and in relation to the guidelines of the OECD Guide, including with regard to "remediation" because, even if Eni did not publicly admit its responsibilities, much less apologize for the misconceptions to my disadvantage, the "reparation" should have been proportionate to the meaning and escalation of the damage caused to my person, and this "remedy", of course, would need to be prescribed based only on "objective criteria", as they were minutely described in my manifestation, dated May 30, 2022 (see Doc. 02).